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Harold I. Elbertt 
VI 
REQUISITES OF ADVANCEMENTS 
231 
AVOLUNT.ARY inter vivos transfer by a parent to a child is not an advancement so long as the transferor lives. The purpose of the 
doctrine is to equalize an intestate' s property among his children. It 
is auxiliary to the distribution of his estate that the question of advance-
ment is raised.220 The death of the transferor is not enough to give 
rise to the doctrine. The person seeking to charge the intestate's 
heirs with an advancement must prove several additional facts. The 
legislation of each state determines what must be proved in order to 
charge the transferee with an advancement. 
A. Intent of the Advancor 
A parent or grandparent may transfer property during his life-
time to a child or grandchild. On his death intestate the courts are 
often called upon to determine whether the transaction was a gift, a 
resulting trust or an advancement. In all states except Kentucky and 
South Carolina, the rule is that the intent of the advancor at the time 
of the transaction is the determining factor in ascertaining whether 
a transfer is or is not an advancement. 221 
* A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the School of Law of the University of 
Michigan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the S.J.D. degree. Part I was 
published in March 1953, Vol. 51, pp. 665-704. 
t Member, Missouri and Oklahoma Bars.-Ed. 
220 Harper v. Harris, (8th Cir. 1923) 294 F. 44. 
221 Booth v. Foster, 111 Ala. 312, 20 S. 356 (1895); Fennell v. Henry, 70 Ala. 484 
(1881); Holland v. Bonner, 142 Ark. 214, 218 S.W. 665 (1920); In re Guardianship 
of Hudelson, (Cal. App. 1941) 109 P. (2d) 964; Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 
(1927); Barron v. Barron, 181 Ga. 505, 182 S.E. 851 (1935); Parker v. Parker, 147 Ga. 
432, 94 S.E. 543 (1917); Andrews v. Halliday, 63 Ga. 263 (1879). In that case the 
intestate thought that he had advanced each of his children an equal amount, but in fact 
some had received more than others. The court ruled that the mere fact he thought he 
had advanced his children equal amounts did not relieve them from accounting for ad-
vancements. The court said, at 269-270: "If the advancements were really unequal, that 
the intestate was under a misapprehension as to their equality would not make the least 
difference. Why should it? The scheme of the law is for each distributee to account for 
what he actually got by way of advancement, not for what the ancestor may have supposed 
he got. And this does not interfere with the right of the latter to put a valuation upon 
property where he has undertaken to do so. The two questions are altogether different." 
Johnson v. Belden, 20 Conn. 322 (1850); Meeker v. Meeker, 16 Conn. 383 (1844); Culp 
v. Wilson, 133 Ind. 294, 32 N.E. 928 (1893); Dille v. Webb, 61 Ind. 85 (1878); Duling 
v. Johnson, 32 Ind. 155 (1869); In re Sell's Estate, 197 Iowa 696, 197 N.W. 922 (1924); 
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In England, since passage of the Administration of Estates Act of 
1925, the intent of the advancor is determinative.222 · However, an 
analysis of the English cases decided prior to that date casts a great 
deal of doubt on the role that the intent of the advancor played in 
determining whether or not a voluntary inter vivas transfer of prop-
erty was an advancement. In no English case was the court called 
upon to determine the intent of the advancor. The cases never speak 
of his intent nor of the intent of the advancee. However, opinions by 
well known English jurists tend to indicate that the intent of the ad-
vancor was regarded as immaterial. In Edwards v. Freeman,223 Lord 
Chief Justice Raymond, in commenting on the advancement provision 
of the statute of distributions, said: 
"But then the act takes it into consideration, that there may 
be some of the children who have received a portion or advance-
ment before, but not so much as to make up their full share; in 
that case such child so advanced but in part, shall have so much 
more out of the intestate' s personal estate as will suffice to make 
his share equal to that of the other children. The statute takes 
nothing away that has been given to any of the children, however 
unequal they may have been, how much soever that may exceed 
Ellis v. Newell, 120 Iowa 71, 94 N.W. 463 (1903); Bash v. Bash, 182 Iowa 55, 165 
N.W. 399 (1917); McCabe v. Broeme, 107 Md. 490, 69 A. 259 (1908); Clark v. Willson, 
27 Md. 693 (1867); Parks v. Parks, 19 Md. 323 (1863); Garrett v. Colvin, 77 Miss. 408, 
26 S. 963 (1899); Schlicher v. Keeler, (N.J. Ch. 1905) 62 A. 4; Wolfe v. Galloway, 
211 N.C. 361, 190 S.E. 213 (1937); Nobles v. Davenport, 185 S.C. 162, 116 S.E. 407 
(1923); Thompson v. Smith, 160 N.C. 256, 75 S.E. 1010 (1911); Kiger v. Terry, 119 
N.C. 456, 26 S.E. 38 (1896); O'Connor v. Flick, 271 Pa. 249, 114 A. 636 (1921); In 
re Brahm's Estate, 269 Pa. 82, 112 A. 21 (1920); Johnson v. Patterson, 81 Tenn. (13 
Lea) 626 (1884); Morris v. Morris, 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.) (1872). In that case the court 
said, at 816: ''The provision in Section 2431 of the Code, that 'Absolute equality shall 
be observed in the division of estates of deceased persons, except where a will has been 
made and its provisions render equality impossible,' is a mere announcement of a rule of 
law of effective existence without the Statute; and was expressed by the Legislature with 
a view to the estate owned by the deceased at the moment of his death, and upon the 
idea that no advancements had been made by him in his lifetime. It was not intended to 
restrict or enlarge the general rule upon the subject of advancements. • • ." Rowe v. Rowe, 
144 Va. 816, 130 S.E. 771 (1925); McClanahan v. McClanahan, 36 W.Va. 34, H S.E. 
419 (1892). Since the doctrine depends on the intent of the intestate, the courts hold that 
an insane person is incapable of making an advancement. In re Guardianship of Hudelson, 
supra this note; In re Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 234 (1940). In 
that case sisters of an incompetent petitioned the probate court for an allowance of support 
out of his estate. The court made them an allowance and decreed that the amount so 
received should be charged as an advancement. Insofar as the technical doctrine of ad-
vancements is concerned that decision is clearly erroneous. The doctrine is not applicable 
where the parties concerned are brothers and sisters. In addition, the advancor was in-
capable of exercising the required intent. Perhaps the decision can be justified as an 
advance. 
22215 Geo. V, c. 23, §47(I)(iii) (1925). 
223 2 P. Wms. 436, 24 Eng. Rep. 803 at 806 (1727). 
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the remainder of the personal estate left by the intestate at his 
death, the child may, if he pleases, keep it all; if he be not con-
tented, but would have more, then he must bring into hotchpot 
what he has before received; this manifestly seems to be the in-
tention of the act, grounded upon the most just rule of equity, 
equality." 
In Edwards 11. Freeman, Lord Chief Justice Raymond also said: 
" ... the statute of distribution does not break into any settlement 
that has been made by the father; it only meddles with what is 
left undisposed of by him, and of that only makes such a will for 
the intestate, as a father, free from the partiality of affections, 
would himself make; and this I may call a parliamentary will." 
In Blackley 11. Blockley,224 Judge Pearson said: 
"I think the intention of the statute was not to disturb any-
thing which had been done by the intestate in his lifetime, but 
that that which had been done should be taken into account in 
estimating his children's shares of his estate. That makes the 
whole of such a transaction between father and son fair. If the 
father makes a will, saying that he wishes the son to have what he 
has given him in his lifetime over and above what he has given 
him by his will, the son will take it. But if the father dies intes-
tate, the law says, the right rule between children is equality, 
and, so far as is possible, there should be equality among the chil-
dr " en. 
Because either there was doubt as to whether the intent of the 
advancor determined the nature of a voluntary inter vivos transfer or 
because the consensus among English lawyers was that the intent of 
the advancor was immaterial, Parliament decided that a clarification 
or change of law was necessary and consequently enacted as a part 
of the Administration of Estates Act of 1925 the following provision: 
" ... then any money or property which, by way of advancement 
or on marriage of a child of the intestate, has been paid to such 
child by the intestate or settled by the intestate for the benefit of 
such child (including any life or less interest and including prop-
erty covenanted to be paid or settled) shall, subject to any contrary 
intention expressed or appearing from the circumstances of the 
case, be taken as being so paid or settled in or towards satisfaction 
of the share of such child or the share which such child would 
have taken if living at the death of the intestate .... "225 
224 29 Ch. Div. 250 at 253 (1885). Cf. Taylor v. Taylor, L.R. 20 Eq. 155 (1875). 
22s 15 Geo. V., c. 23, §47l(iii) (1925). 
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Although the English statute of distributions is the prototype of 
most American statutes, American courts had no difficulty in deter-
mining that the intent of the advancor determines whether a volun-
tary inter vivos tr~sfer is an advancement. South Carolina is the 
only state in which an American court, construing an advancement 
statute similar to the statute of distributions, held that the intent of 
the advancor was i~material. 226 A perusal of the American decisions 
indicates that some courts do not correctly interpret the English cases. 
For instance, the Kentucky court in Barber v. Taylor's Heirs,221 cites 
Edwards v. Freeman as authority for the rule that the intent of the 
advancor controls. In Graves v. Spedden,228 the Maryland court, 
without citing any English authority, stated that in Maryland, as in 
England, the intention of the intestate determines whether or not a 
gift of property is an advancement. In Mitchell's Distributees v. 
Mitchell's Admrs.,229 the Alabama court stated that the law of advance-
ments was based on the custom of London. The court pointed out 
that under the custom the intent of the advancor controlled. Since 
it is doubtful whether the English statute of distributions is based on 
the custom, the decision of the Alabama court seems unsound.230 
Most cases do not rely on any authority but merely assume that 
an advancement depends on the intent of the advancor. Some de-
cisions reach the same conclusions on the theory that a person has the 
absolute right to dispose of his property as he pleases, and therefore, 
the intent of the transferor determines the nature of the transaction.231 
This proposition was well expressed by the North Carolina court in 
the case of James v. J ames232 as follows: 
" 'A man has a right to do with his own property as he chooses,' 
is a proposition agreed to on all hands. The restriction is, he shall 
not interfere with the rights of other persons which are recognized 
either at law or in equity; hence he is not at liberty either by sale 
or gift to dispose of property to which another person is entitled 
by mortgage or deed or trust, nor is he at liberty to dispose of his 
property by gift in respect to his creditors unless he retains prop-
erty amply sufficient to pay his debts. 
"A child is not a creditor of his father and has no right to 
226 Heyward v. Middleton, 65 S.C. 493, 43 S.E. 956 (1903); Rees v. Rees, 11 Rich. 
Eq. (S.C.) 86 (1859); M'Caw v. Blewit, 2 McCord Eq. (S.C.) 90 (1827). 
221 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 84 (1839). 
22s 46 Md. 527 (1877). 
220 8 Ala. 414 (1845). 
230 See fust instalment of this article, 51 lvI:rCH. L. Rsv. 665 at 672-673 (1953). 
231Holland v. Bonner, 142 Ark. 214, 218 S.W. 665 (1920). 
232 76 N.C. 331 at 332 (1887). 
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object, either in law or in equity, to the father's right of disposition. 
The child has a mere 'expectancy.'" 
In a few cases the courts have reached the same result by referring 
to the advancement statute. For example, in Kiger 11. T erry,233 the 
North Carolina court pointed out that in a few states the intent of the 
parent was excluded by statute and in those states all transfers by him 
are advancements. The court then pointed out that their statute did 
not expressly exclude the parent's intent. Using these statements as 
a basis for its decision, the court said that the statute left in force the 
evident rule" ... that the owner of property may dispose of it accord-
ing to his own desire .... " 
In Indiana, the statutes read in part as follows: "Advancements 
in real or personal property shall be charged against the child to whom 
the advancement is made . . . but if the advancement exceed the 
equal proportion of the child advanced, the excess shall not be re-
funded."234 
"The maintaining, or educating or giving money to a child, with-
out a view toward a portion or settlement in life, shall not be deemed 
an advancement."235 In construing that statute, the Indiana court 
ruled that the question of whether a transfer of property is an advance-
ment or gift depends on the intent of the advancor or donor. As a 
basis for this decision the court pointed out that the first part of the 
statute does not define advancement, and the latter provision merely 
declares what is not an advancement. Therefore, since intent deter-
mines what is not an advancement under some circumstances, all ad-
vancements must depend on the intent of the advancor. 236 
Some courts have reached the conclusion that an advancement 
depends on the intent of the advancor by relying on cases where the 
question to be determined was whether the transfer was a gift or re-
sulting trust.237 In Jackson 11. Matsdorf,238 a parent transferred title 
to property to his daughter in order to avoid claims of creditors. Later, 
he sought to compel her to reconvey the property on the theory that 
the transfer was a resulting trust. The court ruled that the parent's 
intent at the time of the transfer determined whether the transfer was 
233 119 N.C. 456, 26 S.E. 38 (1896). 
234 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) §6-2354. 
235 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) §1504. 
236 Woolery v. Woolery, 29 Ind. 249 (1868). 
237 Culp v. Price, 107 Iowa 133, 77 N.W. 848 (1899); Herbert v. Alvord, 75 N.J. 
Eq. 428, 72 A. 946 (1909); Jackson v. Matsdorf, 11 Johns. (N.Y.) 91 (1814); Burbeck 
v. Spollen, 6 Ohio Dec. 1118, 10 Am. Law Rec. 491 (1882). 
2as 11 Johns. (N.Y.) 91 (1814). 
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an advancement or resulting trust. Of course, the use of the word 
"advancement" was inaccurate because a transfer is never an advance-
ment until after the death of the advancor. In Burheck v. Spollen,239 
the Ohio court, when called upon to determine whether a transfer was 
a gift or advancement, erroneously relied on the case of Jackson v. 
Matsdorf for authority for the proposition that advancement depends 
on the intent of the advancor. 
In some states, by statute, a gift or grant of property is not an 
advancement unless it is expressed in the grant to be so made or 
charged in writing by the intestate or acknowledged in writing as such 
by the child. Courts, in interpreting that legislation, state that the 
statute does not change the rule that the intent of the advancor deter-
mines whether a transaction is a gift or advancement. Such a rule 
merely prescribes the manner by which the intention shall be proved.240 
I. The Kentucky Rule. The previous Kentucky statute on ad- · 
vancements reads in part as follows: " ... where any children of 
the intestate . . . shall have received from the intestate in his life-
time any real estate by way of advancement, . . . such advancement 
shall be brought into hotchpot with the estate descended."241 Under 
that statute the Kentucky court held that the intent of the advancor 
or donor determined whether the transaction was an advancement or 
gift.242 The present Kentucky statute reads in part as follows: "Any 
real or personal property or money, given or devised by a parent or 
grandparent to a descendant, shall be charged to the descendant.243 
An analysis of this statute shows that the intent of the advancor is 
immaterial.244 The statute also provides that "the maintaining, or 
educating or the giving of money to a child or grandchild without any 
view to a portion or settlement in life, shall not be deemed an advance-
ment." Under that proviso of the statute, the intent of the advancor 
or donor is determinative. 245 
239 6 Ohio Dec. lll8, 10 Am. Law Rec. 491 (1882). 
240Elliott v. Western Coal and Mining Co., 243 ill. 614, 90 N.E. ll04 (1910); 
Comer v. Comer, 119 ill. 170, 8 N.E. 796 (1886). In that case the court pointed out that 
prior to the act requiring advancements to be charged in writing all substantial gifts were 
presumed to be advancements. Since the enactment of the statute, there is no such pre-
sumption unless the evidence of the advancement is written. Fellows v. Little, 46 N.H. 
27 (1865). 
241Ky. Stat. (1792-1834) tit. 61, §15 and tit. 75, §28. 
242 Barber v. Taylor's Heirs, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 84 (1839). 
24s Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140. 
244 Gossage v. Gossage's Admr., 281 Ky. 575, 136 S.W. (2d) 775 (1940); Ecton v. 
Flynn, 229 Ky. 476, 17 S.W. (2d) 407 (1929); Boblett v. Barlow, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1076, 
83 S.W. 145 (1904); Bowles v. Winchester, 76 Ky. (13 Bush.) 1 (1877). 
245 Crain v. Mallone, 130 Ky. 125, ll3 S.W. 67 (1908); Hill's Guardian v. Hill, 
122 Ky. 681, 92 S.W. 924 (1906). 
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In that state, a person who has made a gift of property to a de-
scendant and does not want it charged as an advancement can defeat 
the statute in three ways: (I) by disposing of all his property by will, 
(2) by giving all his property away before his death, or (3) by 
advancements to a descendant which exceed his share of the estate.246 
In all other states he can defeat the statute in these ways and, with the 
exception of South Carolina, by declaring that the transfer is an ab-
solute gift. In South Carolina, since the intent of the transferor is 
regarded as immaterial, he cannot defeat the statute by declaring that 
a voluntary inter vivos transfer of property is an absolute gift. In all 
states, except those that hold the doctrine of advancements applicable 
to cases of partial intestacy, a person can defeat the doctrine if he dies 
intestate as to part of his property. 
B. Acceptance 
Most courts which hold that the intent of the advancor determines 
whether a voluntary inter vivas transfer of property from a parent to 
a child is an advancement, hold that the intent of the advancee or 
transferee is immaterial. These same states also hold that a voluntary 
inter vivas transfer by a parent to a child is prima facie an advance-
ment. Likewise, they hold that an instruction which reads " ... 
· advancements must not only have been intended by the parent as. an 
advancement, but must also have been accepted by the child as an 
advancement," is erroneous. It is not necessary for the parent to say 
to the child: "Now I give you this as an advancement," and the child 
to respond: "I accept it as such." All that is required to show accept-
ance is for the child to receive the money or property and in that sense 
accept it.247 Such a rule, although consistent with the rule that an 
246 Cleaver v. Kirk's "Heirs, 60 Ky. (3 Mete.) 270 (1860). Cf. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 
29 Ky. L. Rep. 239 (1906). 
247 Ireland v. Dyer, 133 Ga. 851, 67 S.E. 195 (1910); Holliday v. Wingfield, 59 Ga. 
206 (1877). Cf. Sherwood v. Smith, 23 Conn. *516 (1855). In that case the court 
said at 521: "A son might be willing to receive property as a gift, which he would prefer 
not to take, as a part of his portion in his father's estate. He might be willing to receive 
a collegiate education, if the expenses were borne as a gift, when, if they were to be 
charged to him as an advancement, he might prefer having the amount in a different form." 
Cf. Davis v. Garrett, 91 Tenn. (7 Pickle) 147, 18 S.W. 113 (1892). In that case a 
father conveyed a slave to his seven-year-old daughter. He registered the title as required 
by law. It was held that the transaction was an advancement. Since the conveyance was 
beneficial to the daughter, the court presumed that she accepted it. Rains v. Hays, 74 
Tenn. (6 Lea) 303 (1880). To constitute a valid advancement, the property must be 
delivered to the advancee in the advancor's lifetime. City National Bank v. Morrissey, 97 
Conn. 480, 117 A. 493 (1922); Mason and Holman's Admrs. v. Holman, 78 Tenn. (IO 
Lea) 315 (1882); West v. Jones, 85 Va. 616, 8 S.E. 468 (1889). Cf. Davis v. Garrett, 
supra this note. 
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advancement depends on the intent of the advancor, can lead to dis-
astrous results. A child may be willing to receive property as a gift, 
which he might prefer not to take as part of his portion in his father's 
estate. If his father does not inform him that the transfer is an ad-
vancement, he may think that it is an absolute gift. The only jus-
tification for the rule laid down by the courts is that the child is 
charged with knowledge of the law and if he accepts the property 
without first ascertaining his father's intention, he is deemed to have 
accepted the property as a part portion. 
In Hartwell v. Rice,248 a father-in-law gave money to his son-in-law 
for support of his insane daughter. The son-in-law acknowledged in 
writing that this was an advancement to the daughter. The Massa-
chusetts court held that the money so received should be charged as an 
advancement. In that case the court did not hold that an advancee 
need not be of sound mind at the time of the transfer. The decision 
was based on the fact that prior to the married woman's act a wife's 
personal property was vested in her husband. Therefore, the acknowl-
edgement by the husband was sufficient to charge it as part of his wife's 
share in her father's estate. 
That case suggests an interesting problem. If the transferee of 
property is insane at the time of transfer, a person might argue that 
his lack of mental capacity prevents the amount received by him from 
beihg charged as an advancement. However, the law presumes the 
acceptance of a bene:6.cial gift by one who, because of his feebleness 
of mind, is incapable of accepting it.249 Since the intent of the ad-
vancee is generally regarded as immaterial and an advancement is 
said to be a gift, most courts would hold that the advancee need not 
be of sound mind at the time he accepted the property. 
C. Time When Title Must Pass 
Many cases state that it is necessary to the existence of an advance-
ment that irrevocable title to the property pass to the advancee in the 
lifetime of the advancor.250 These same cases often define an ad-
vancement as "a perfect and irrevocable gift." Most cases make such 
248 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 587 (1854). 
249 Pohl v. Fulton, 86 Kan. 14, 119 P. 716 (1911); Malone's Committee v. Lebus, 
116 Ky. 975, 77 S.W. 180 (1903). 
250 McClellan v. McCauley, 158 Miss. 456, 130 S. 145 (1930); Greene v. Greene, 
145 Miss. 87, llO S. 218 (1926); Nobles v. Davenport, 183 N.C. 207, lll S.E. 180 
(1922). Cf. Batton v. Allen, 5 N.J. Eq. (1 Halst.) 99 (1845). In that case a parent, after 
his son's death, satisfied a judgment held against him. On the parent's death, his adminis-
trators sought to deduct the amount of the judgment from the grandchild's distributive 
share. Held, that the transfer must occur in the lifetime of the advancee. 
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statements by way of dicta.251 However, in the recent case of Albers 
11. Y oung,252 the Colorado court held that an advancement must be an 
irrevocable gift in the lifetime of the advancor. In that case an intes-
tate opened a joint bank account in his name and that of his daughter. 
Only two deposits were made, both by him, and solely from his funds. 
By statute, a joint bank account in Colorado may be paid to anyone of 
the joint depositors, whether the other is living or not. The court held 
that the money in the account was not an advancement to the daughter. 
Although that case seems in accord with conventional advance-
ment concepts, other cases have reached a different result. In Thomp-
son 11. Latimer,253 the same definitions were relied on in an effort to 
convince the Kentucky court that a life insurance policy in which the 
insured reserved the right to change the beneficiary was not an ad-
vancement. The court rejected that contention and held that the 
policies should be charged to the child as a part portion. Other cases 
are to the same effect.254 
In Hughey 11. Eichelherger,255 the South Carolina court held that 
land conveyed by an intestate to a trustee for the benefit of his daughter 
was an advancement, even though he reserved the right to revoke the 
trust. 
D. Intestacy of the Ad11ancor 
A parent or other person to whom the doctrine of advancements 
applies, may make a gift to one of his children, and on his death leave 
a will disposing of all his property. Under such circumstances, all 
courts hold that the doctrine of advancements is inapplicable. The 
courts reach this result by holding that the foundation of the doctrine 
is to effectuate the presumed intent of a parent that his children should 
share equally in his estate, but where he disposes of his entire estate 
by will his directions are given. Therefore, if one child receives more 
than another, he did not intend for them to share equally.256 
251 Fennell v. Henry, 70 Ala. 484 (1881); Stacy v. Stacy, 175 Ark. 763, 300 S.W. 
437 (1927); Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927); Grattan v. Grattan, 18 
ill. (8 Peck) 167 (1856). 
252 119 Colo. 37, 199 P. (2d) 890 (1948). 
2113 209 Ky. 491, 273 S.W. 65 (1925). 
254 Culberhouse v. Culberhouse, 68 Ark. 405, 59 S.W. 38 (1900); Justice v. Mead, 
220 Ky. 638, 295 S.W. 976 (1927); Rickenbacker v. Zimmerman, 10 S.C. 110 (1878). 
255 11 s.c. 36 (1878). 
256 Harper v. Harris, (8th Cir. 1923) 294 F. 44; Alward v. Woodward, 315 ru. 150, 
146 N.E. 154 (1925); In re Morgan's Estate, 226 Iowa 68, 281 N.W. 346 (1938); Pole 
v. Simmons, 45 Md. 246 (1876); Domzalski v. Domzalski, 303 Mich. 103, 5 N.W. (2d) 
672 (1942); In re Staples' Estate, 214 Minn. 337, 8 N.W. (2d) 45 (1943); In re Beier's 
Estate, 205 Minn. 43, 284 N.W. 833 (1939); Kuhne v. Gau, 138 Minn. 34, 163 N.W. 
962 (1917); Kragnes v. Kragnes, 125 Minn. ll5, 145 N.W. 785 (1914); Graham v. Karr, 
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Also, most advancement statutes read: "If any estate, real or per-
sonal, has been given by an intestate. . . ." The words of such a 
statute require it to be construed as applying only to persons dying 
wholly intestate.257 In In re Bush's Estate,258 a parent made advance-
ments to a son. In 1931, he executed a will naming this son as a 
residuary legatee. Between 1931 and 1939 when he died, he made 
several more advancements to him. The advancements were evi-
denced by non-interest-bearing notes which provided that the amount 
therein stated should be deducted from the son's share of the estate. 
The Kansas court required the son to account for advancements made 
after the execution of the will. That case is contrary to the over-
wh~lming weight of authority which holds that a testator is conclu-
sively presumed to have intended all voluntary transfers of property, 
whether made prior or subsequent to the will, to be absolute gifts. The 
underlying theory of these decisions is that a will speaks from the date 
of the testator's death.259 The only justification for the decision in 
In re Bush's Estate, supra, is to hold that the doctrines of ademption 
or satisfaction of a legacy apply to a residuary legatee.260 
Often a child borrows money from a parent and executes a note 
which provides that it shall be regarded as an advancement if the 
parent dies before the payment is made. On the parent's death tes-
tate, the child may claim that he cannot be charged with the sum so 
received. Most courts hold that-the sum so received can be charged 
as a part of the child's share of the estate.261 The Massachusetts court 
holds that the child cannot be compelled to account.262 The view of 
the Massachusetts court is preferable. In an agreement of this type 
331 Mo. 1157, 55 S.W. (2d) 995 (1935); Wickliffe v. Wickliffe, 206 Mo. App. 42, 226 
S.W. 1035 (1920); In re Lear's Estate, 146 Mo. App. 642, 124 S.W. 592 (1910); In re 
Wantz's Estate, 137 Neb. 307, 289 N.W. 363 (1939); In re Willis' Estate, 158 Misc. 
534, 287 N.Y.S. 165 (1936); In re Bernhard's Estate, 151 Misc. 480, 273 N.Y.S. 250 · 
(1934); Prevette v. Prevette, 203 N.C. 89, 164 S.E. 623 (1928); Dodson v. Fulk, 147 
N.C. 530, 61 S.E. 383 (1908); In re Loesch's Estate, 322 Pa. 105, 185 A. 191 (1936); 
O'Connor v. Flick, 271 'Pa. 249, 114 A. 636 (1921); McQuiddy Printing Co. v. Hirsig, 
23 Tenn. A. 434, 134 S.W. 197 (1939); Bailey v. Bailey, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 212 
S.W. (2d) 189; In re Sipchen's Estate, 180 Wis. 504, 193 N.W. 385 (1923). 
251 Linell's Admr. v. Linell, 21 N.J. Eq. 81 (1870). 
258 155 Kan. 556, 127 P. (2d) 455 (1942). Cf. Toomer v. Toomer, 5 N.C. (I 
Murph.) 93 (1805). 
259 Wickliffe v. Wickliffe, 206 Mo. App. 42, 226 S.W. 1035 (f920); In re Pardee's 
Estate, 240 Wis. 19, 1 N.W. (2d) 803 (1942). 
2ao Hayes v. Welling, 38 R.I. 553, 96 A. 843 (1916). 
261Jn re Esmond's Estate, 154 Ill. App. 357 (1910); Kinney v. Newbold, 115 Iowa 
145, 88 N.W. 328 (1901); City National Bank of San Saba v. Penn, (Tex. Civ. App. 
1936) 92 S.W. (2d) 532. Cf. Robinson v. Ramsey, 161 Ga. 1, 129 S.E. 837 (1925). 
2a2 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Underwood, 297 Mass. 320, 8 N.E. (2d) 792 (1937); 
In re Pardee's Estate, 240 Wis. 19, 1 N.W. (2d) 803 (1942). Cf. In re Lake's Estate, 214 
Wis. 474, 253 N.W. 174 (1934). In that case a testatrix left surviving only brothers and 
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there is no enforceable obligation. If the parent were to sue the child, 
the latter would contend that he had the right to elect how payment 
should be effected and that he elected to have it charged as part of his 
inheritance. In such a suit the child would win. The transaction 
is at most an advancement with a right in the advancee to elect whether 
he will let it be charged as a part of his inheritance or change the 
character of the transaction to a loan by paying the advancor.263 
In some cases, a testator provides that his estate should descend as 
if no will had been made. For instance, in Trammel 11. T rammel,264 
a testator provided that realty should descend the same as if no will 
had been made. The court ruled that the testator intended for ad-
vancements to be taken into account in the division of his estate. In 
DeCourmant 11. Beyert,265 a testator bequeathed his property " ... as 
provided by the laws of the State of New York in cases of intestacy." 
The court held that advancements need not be accounted for. These 
cases appear to be in direct conB.ict. The only possible reconciliation 
is that both cases involve the construction of a will and the court was 
simply ascertaining the intent qf the testator. On that basis and on 
no other can they be distinguished. 265a 
Many times a parent makes an advancement and then decides to 
make a will. If he revokes or cancels the will, the doctrine of advance-
ments is applicable. As a justification for this rule, the courts state 
sisters. One of her brothers gave her a certificate which stated that testatrix had advanced 
him $1000, to be repaid with interest at some future time "or amount taken from my 
share or share of my heirs from estate." Held, that the $1000 was to be deducted from 
the brother's share of the estate. Since the parties were brothers and sisters, the doctrine 
of advancements was inapplicable. 
263 Cf. Leask v. McCarthy, 147 App. Div. 796, 132 N.Y.S. 92 (1911). 
264 148 Ind. 487, 47 N.E. 925 (1897). 
265 36 Hun (N.Y.) 382 (1885); LeCoulteux de Caumont Exr. v. Morgan, affd. 104 
N.Y. 74, 9 N.E. 861 (1887). On appeal the New York Court of Appeals affirmed because 
the transfers were not intended as advancements. The court indicated that the doctrine 
of advancements was applicable to such a case. 
265aHarris v. Allen, 18 Ga. 177 (1855). In that case a testator directed that his 
property should be distributed according to the statute of distributions. Both the court and 
the parties litigant assumed that the doctrine was applicable. Croom v. Herring, 11 N.C. 
393 (1826). In that case testator devised his property " ••. to be divided among all my 
heirs agreeable to the statute of distribution of intestates' estates." Held, that advancements 
need not be accounted for. Brown v. Brown, 37 N.C. (2 Ired. L.) 309 (1842); Raiford 
v. Raiford, 41 N.C. (6 Ired. Eq.) 490 (1849). In that case a deed of trust provided that 
after the death of the grantor the property should be equally divided "among all the rest 
of my heirs and distributees .•. in the same manner, and according to the rules of descent 
and distribution in intestate estates .•• .'' Held, that advancements must be accounted for. 
The court distinguished the case of Croom v. Herring, supra this note, in the following 
language at 499: "At all events, that decision has no application to the point now under 
consideration. There, the word 'heirs' was used in reference to personal property. Here, 
the word 'heirs' is used in reference to land, and the word 'distributees' in reference to 
personal property-both words of definite legal meaning .••• " 
242 MrcmcAN LAw RBvmw [ Vol. 52 
that if the making of a will indicates an intent to extinguish an .ad-
vancement, then revoki}?-g or cancelling the will indicates a change of 
purpose.266 Likewise, if the will is wholly invalid or inoperative the 
doctrine of advancements is applicable.267 
I. Parti.al Intestacy. A testator may make advancements to some 
of his children during his lifetime and his will may be drawn in such 
a way that he dies intestate as to part of his property. Under such 
circumstances, the courts in most jurisdictions hold that advancements 
cannot be charged to the children. 268 The English cases reach this 
conclusion on the technical rule that, since there is a will, the testator 
did not die intestate within the meaning of the statute.269 In England, 
since the passage of the Administration of Estates Act of 1925, the 
doctrine of advancements is applicable to cases of partial intestacy.270 
The American decisions are based in part on the language of the 
stqtute and also on the presumed intent of the testator to create an 
inequality which would be defeated if children were compelled to 
account for advancements.271 
The California statute uses the word "decedent'' rather than the 
word "intestate." In that state the courts hold that the doctrine is 
applicable where a person dies intestate as to part of his property.272 
In Ohio, although the statute reads: "If any estate, real or personal, 
has been given by an intestate . . . ,"273 the court tends to consider 
the advanceill:ent concept applicable to cases of partial intestacy.274 
266 Hartwell v. Rice, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 587 (1854). 
261 In re Ford, [1902] 2 Ch. 605. Cf. Prichard v. Prichard, 91 W.Va. 398, 113 S.E. 
256 (1922). 
268 Blankes v. Clark, 68 Ark. 98, 56 S.W. 1063 (1900); Gilmore v. Jenkins, 129 
Iowa 686, 106 N.W. 193 (1906); Hayden v. Burch, 9 Gill (Md.) 79 (1850); Stewart v. 
Pattison, 8 Gill (Md.) 46 (1849); In re Finck's Estate, 120 Misc. 428, 198 N.Y.S. 670 
(1923); In re Ogden's Estate, 211 Pa. 247, 60 A. 785 (1905). Cf. Leffier v. Leffier, 151 
Fla. 455, 10 S. (2d) 799 (1942). 
269 Cowper v. Scott, 3 P. Wms. 119, 24 Eng. Rep. 993 (1731); Walton v. Walton, 
14 Ves. Jr. 318, 33 Eng. Rep. 543 (1807). 
210 15 Geo. V., c. 23, §49 (1925). 
271 Gilmore v. Jenkins, 129 Iowa 686, 106 N.W. 193 (1906); Hayden v. Burch, 9 
Gill (Md.) 46 (1849); Linell's Admr. v. Linell, 21 N.J. Eq. 81 (1870). . 
272 In re Rawnsley's Estate, (Cal. App. 1949) 210 P. (2d) 888; In re Hayne's Estate, 
165 Cal. 568, 133 P. 277 (1913). In that case the court said at 573: "It is suggested by 
the respondent that the statutory provisions regarding advancements do not apply, except 
in cases where the decedent dies wholly intestate. Some of the decisions so declare because 
the statute under consideration was believed to contain such a limitation. Kent v. Hopkins, 
86 Hun 611, •.• where the statute began with the words 'If any child of an intestate,' 
is an example. Our code contains no words which imply a similar limitation." 
213 Ohio Code Ann. (Baldwin, 1940) §10503-19. 
274 Dittoes Admr. v. Cluney's Exr., 22 Ohio St. 436 (1872); Wright v. Merchant, 
2 Ohio Dec. 742 (1862). 
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The courts of that state hold that the doctrine is not applicable where 
the will shows that the testator thought he had disposed of his entire 
estate.21is 
The Tennessee statute reads: "Absolute equality shall be observed 
in the division of the estates of deceased persons, except where a will 
has been made, and its provisions make equality impossible."276 In 
construing this statute the courts of that state hold that the doctrine 
of advancements applies to partial intestacy and that persons claiming 
a share of the undevised estate must account for advancements.277 
The Kentucky,278 Virginia,279 and West Virginia280 advancement 
statutes are, by their very language, applicable where the will does 
not dispose of all the testator's property. The Kentucky statute re-
quires a devisee to account for the value of the property devised to him 
before he can share in the part of the estate not disposed of by the 
testator's will.281 In Virginia, the courts, in construing the advance-
ment statute, have reached a like result.282 Since the West Virginia 
statute is almost identical with the Virginia legislation, the courts of 
that state will undoubtedly follow the Virginia rule. 
2. Applicability of the Doctrine of Advancements to a Preter-
mitted Child. Many states have statutes which provide that a child 
not named or provided for in his parent's will shall receive a share of 
the estate as in the case of intestacy, unless such child shall have been 
provided for by the testator in his lifetime or unless it appears that the 
omission was intentional, and not occasioned by accident or mistake. 
A parent may have made advancements to his children and later die 
testate, leaving as an heir a child not provided for in his will. In San-
ford v. Sanford,283 the New York court, without much discussion of 
the problem, held that such a child could compel the other children 
to account for advancements. However, in Gibson v. Johnson,284 the 
Missouri court held that the doctrine of advancements was inapplicable. 
211, Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432 (1857). 
276 Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) §8402. 
211 Pearce v. Gleaves, IO Yerg. (Tenn.) 359 (1837). 
218Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140. 
219Va. Code Ann. (1950) §64.17. 
280W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §4094. 
281 Nolan's Exrs. v. Nolan, 220 Ky. 613, 295 S.W. 893 (1927); StifFs Exr. v. Stiff, 
217 Ky. 716, 290 S.W. 718 (1927); Brewer's Admr. v. Brewer, 181 Ky. 400, 205 S.W. 
393 (1918); Farley v. Stacey, 177 Ky. 109, 197 S.W. 636 (1917); Gulley v. Lillard's 
Exr., 145 Ky. 746, 141 S.W. 58 (1911). 
282 Poff v. Poff, 128 Va. 62, 104 S.E. 719 (1920); Payne v. Payne, 128 Va. 33, 104 
S.E. 712 (1920). 
2sa 61 Barb. (N.Y.) 293 (1872). 
284 331 Mo. 1198, 56 S.W. (2d) 783 (1932); Wilson v. Miller, (Va. Spec. Ct. App. 
1855) 1 Pat. and H. 353. See In re Rawnsley's Estate, (Cal. App. 1949) 210 P. (2d) 888. 
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The court based its conclusion on the language of the statute which 
requires a person who has received an advancement to elect to "come 
into partition with the other parceners." The court pointed out that 
the title to an estate by coparceny is always by descent; that the persons 
who had received advancements took title by devise as distinguished 
from descent, and that the advancement statute did not apply to de-
visees. The court distinguished Sanford v. Sanford on the ground 
that the language of the New York advancement statute was different. 
3. Applicability of the Doctrine if a Widow Elects to Take Against 
Her Husband's Will. Under our laws of descent and distribution, a 
husband must leave a certain part of his estate to his wife. If he leaves 
her less than the amount he is required to leave her, she may el,ect to 
take against his will as if he died intestate. 
In North Carolina, one of the few states in which a widow can 
compel children to account for advancements, a widow, if she elects 
to take against her husband's will, can compel her children to account 
for advancements.285 That decision seems erroneous in that the su-
preme court of that state has held in other cases that the doctrine of 
advancements is not applicable to cases of partial intestacy.286 In In-
diana, a widow cannot compel her children to account for advance-
ments. However, the supreme court of that state in the case of Banner 
v. Allen,281 by way of dictum, stated that a widow's election to inherit 
as if her husband died intestate did not entitle her to compel her chil-
dren to account for advancements. The court pointed out that her 
husband had not died totally intestate. · 
The dictum of the Indiana court is preferable to the North Caro-
lina decision. The customary statutory words, "her share is to be 
ascertained as if the husband died intestate," are not to be used for the 
purpose of allowing the widow to take advantage of advancements, but 
are used to indicate that the wife of the testator is entitled to a specified 
share of his estate. If, by his will, she inherited the amount she would 
be entitled to as if he died intestate, she could not take advantage of 
advancements. By analogy, she should not be permitted to take ad-
vantage of advancements if she elects to take against his will. 
E. Necessity of a Writing Charging a Gift as an Advancement 
In California, Illinois, Maine, Nevada and Oregon, a child cannot 
be charged with an advancement in the •distribution of his father's 
285 Credle v. Credle, 44 N.C. (1 Busbee L.) 225 (1853). 
286 Jerkins v. Mitchell, 57 N.C. (4 Jones Eq.) 207 (1858). 
287 Banner v. Allen, 25 Ind. 222 (1865). 
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estate unless it is (I) charged as such in the gift or grant or (2) 
charged in writing by the intestate or (3) acknowledged in writing 
as such by the person to whom the gift or grant was made.288 
In several other states the advancement statutes have a provision 
which reads substantially as follows: "All gifts and grants shall be 
deemed to have been made as an advancement if they are expressed 
in the gift or grant to be so made or if charged in writing by the in-
testate as an advancement or acknowledged in writing as such by the 
child or descendant."289 
The courts, in construing the above statute, uniformly hold that 
a gift is not an advancement unless charged in writing in one of the 
ways enumerated in the statute. The basis for this holding is that the 
legislature, by implication, intended to exclude all other ways of proving 
advancements.290 
288 Cal. Probe Code (Deering, 1941) §1050. That section reads as follows: "A gift 
before death shall he considered as an ademption of a bequest or devise of the property 
given; but such gift shall not be taken as an advancement to an heir or as an ademption 
of a general legacy unless such intention is expressed by the testator in the grant or other-
wise in writing, or unless the donee acknowledges it in writing to he such." In re Rawns-
ley's Estate, (Cal. App. 1949) 210 P. (2d) 888; ill. Stat. Ann. (1947) c. 3, §166; Wallace 
v. Reddick, 119 ill. 151, 8 N.E. 801 (1886). In that case an intestate conveyed property 
to his sons prior to 1872, and died in 1874. In 1872 illinois passed a statute requiring a 
writing before a transfer of property shall he an advancement. Since the intestate did not 
charge the transfers in writing as an advancement, the court ruled that they could not he 
so considered. The court said at 158: "This whole matter of descent of property is within 
legislative control. Heirs apparent and prospective distributees, during the ancestor's life-
time, have no vested rights in his estate, nor in the laws of descent. Accordingly, it is held 
the application of a statute changing the rules of descent of property impairs no vested 
rights. This statute is not in terms made prospective in its operation. It seems to have been 
intended to apply to all advancements .•.• " Elliott v. Western Coal and Mining Co., 243 
ill. 614, 90 N.E. 1104 (1910); Young v. Young, 204 ill. 430, 68 N.E. 532 (1903); 
Bartmess v. Fuller, 170 ill. 193, 48 N.E. 452 (1897); Meppen v. Meppen, 392 ill. 30, 
63 N.E. (2d) 755 (1945); Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 156, §4; Porter v. Porter, 51 Me. 376 
(1862); Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1941) §9882.303; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. 
(1940) §16-304. 
289Jdaho Code Ann. (1932) §14-109; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 196, §5; Mich. 
Stat. Ann. (1937) §27.3178 (160); Minn. Stat. Ann. (1946) §525.53; Mont. Rev. Code 
Ann. (1947) §91.414; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §30-115; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §30-2114; 
Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 84, §225; S.D. Code (1939) §56.0116; Utah Code Ann. (1943) 
§101-4-20; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1932) §1351; Wis. Stat. (1947) §318.27. 
290 Barton v. Rice, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 508 (1839); Bullard v. Bullard, 22 Mass. (5 
Pick.) 527 (1827); Bulkeley v. Noble, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 337 (1824); Olney v. Brown, 
163 Mich. 125, 128 N.W. 241 (1910); Lodge v. Fitch, 72 Neb. 652, 101 N.W. 338 
(1904); Baden v. Mier, 71 Neb. 191, 98 N.W. 761 (1904); Courtney v. Daniel, 124 
Okla. 46, 253 P. 990 (1927); In re Yates' Estate, 88 Okla. 259, 213 P. 87 (1923); Mowry 
Admr. v. Smith, 5 R.I. 255 (1858); Petition of Atkinson, 16 R.I. 413, 16 A. 712 (1889); 
Adams' Heirs v. Adams, 22 Vt. 50 (1849); Newell v. Newell, 13 Vt. 24 (1841); Schmidt 
v. Schmidt's Estate, 123 Wis. 295, 101 N.W. 678 (1904); Pomeroy v. Pomeroy, 93 Wis. 
262, 67 N.W. 430 (1896). Cf. Hornstra v. Avon State Bank, 55 S.D. 513, 226 N.W. 740 
(1929). In that case a parent gave one of his children a sum of money. They agreed 
that if the child did not pay the money it was to be charged as a part of her inheritance. 
In South Dakota a writing is required to charge a child with an advancement. On the father's 
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In Georgia, the statute reads: " . . . a memorandum of advance-
ments in the handwriting of the parent or subscribed by him, shall be 
evidence of the fact of advancement."291 The Georgia court was called 
upon to construe this statute in the case of Bransford v. Crawford.292 
In that case, oral declarations of an intestate that notes held by him 
were advancements to his sons were held admiss~ble to prove advance-
ments. The court stated that the legislature did not, by the enactment 
of the statute, intend to require a writing to prove advancements. The 
legislative intention was to set forth one way by which advancements 
may be proved. 
In Vermont, an advancement in real estate must be proved in the 
following ways: (1) where in the gift or grant it is expressed to be an 
advancement, or (2) where the conveyance is for the recited consider-
ation of love and affection, or (3) where the conveyance is acknowl-
edged as such in writing by the advancee. Before a child may be 
charged with personal property as an advancement, the proof must 
show that the property was delivered to the child expressly as an ad-
vancement in the presence of two witnesses.293 
In New Hampshire, real estate given by a parent to a child is not 
an advancement unless (I) the deed recites that the consideration is 
love and affection or (2) it is proved to be an advancement by some 
acknowledgment signed by the party receiving it.2-94 Personal property 
cannot be charged as an advancement unless (1) proved to be such by 
an acknowledgment in writing, signed by the party receiving it, 
(2) by some charge or memorandum thereof in writing, made by the 
deceased or by his order, or (3) unless delivered expressly as an ad-
vancement in the presence of two witnesses who are requested to take 
notice thereof.295 
In Rhode Island, real estate conveyed by deed or gift is an advance-
ment. Personal property delivered to a child or grandchild may be 
charged as an advancement only if (1) charged as such in writing by 
death intestate the court ruled that the ~ could be charged to the son's share of the 
estate. The court pointed out that the money could not be charged as an advancement, 
but based its conclusion on the right of retainer doctrine. 
291 Ga. Code Ann. (Parks, 1937) §113-1014. 
292 51 Ga. 20 (1874). 
293 Vt. Stat. (1947) §3067. 
294 N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 360, §15. 
295 N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 360, §16. 
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the intestate or his order or (2) delivered expressly for that purpose 
in the presence of two witnesses who are requested to take notice 
thereof.296 
If the statute requires a writing before a gift may be charged as an 
advancement, the writing need not use that word, for it is sufficient if 
a reading of the instrument shows that such was the writer's inten-
tion.297 A parent cannot meet the requirements of the statute by 
making a charge against a child in his regular book of accounts.298 
If the charges against the children are kept in a regular book of accounts 
but are kept separate and apart from charges against third persons, 
there is a sufficient compliance with the statute.299 
Since statutes of the type under discussion require advancements 
to be proved by written instruments, no material or essential part of 
the proof can be supplied by parol.800 If an intestate makes an am-
biguous written charge against a child, the acts and declarations of the 
intestate accompanying the making of the charge may be shown for the 
purpose of ascertaining his intention.301 
The writing required by a statute of this type, must be executed 
contemporaneously with the transfer of the property. A writing made 
after the transaction cannot be used as proof of an advancement be-
cause it is in the nature of hearsay evidence. The courts reach this 
result partly by analogy to the rule which requires an entry in a book of 
20s R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 567, §23; Mowry Achnr. v. Smith, 5 R.I. 255 (1858). 
In that case an intestate during his lifetime, transferred a real estate mortgage to three of 
his grandchildren in consideration of love and affection. In Rhode Island a mortgage of 
real estate is personal property. Held, that this could not be charged as an advancement. 
The reasons were (1) that it was not charged as such by a memorandum in writing ancl 
(2) that the evidence did not show that it was delivered as an advancement in the presence 
of witnesses who were requested to take notice thereof. 
297Young v. Young, 204 Ill. 430, 68 N.E. 532 (1903); Bulkeley v. Noble, 19 Mass. 
(2 Pick.) 337 (1824); In re Yates Estate, 88 Okla. 259, 213 P. 87 (1923); Appeal of 
Ashley, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 21 (1826). Cf. Biglow v. Poole, 76 Mass. (IO Gray) 104 
(1857). In that case the intestate's account book contained the following statement on the 
title page: "Small book referred to in my last will and testament, Elated Aug. 2d 1843, 
showing the moneys I have advanced to my children, severally, and. to which I shall give 
credit to any or each of them, as they may pay me from time to time. • • ." Held, that the 
charges in the book were intended to be debts and not advancements. 
298 Fellows v. Little, 46 N.H. 27 (1865); Brown v. Brown, 16 Vt. 197 (1844). Cf. 
Weatherhead v. Field, 26 Vt. 665 (1854). 
299Young v. Young, 204 III. 430, 68 N.E. 532 (1903). 
soo Fellows v. Little, 46 N.H. 27 (1865); Law v. Smith, 2 R.I. 244 (1852); Weather• 
head v. Field, 26 Vt. 665 (1854). 
so1 Elliott v. Western Coal and Mining Co., 243 Ill. 614, 90 N.E. 1104 (1910); 
Liesse v. Fontaine, 181 Wis. 407, 195 N.W. 393 (1923); Arthur v. Arthur, 143 Wis. 
126, 126 N.W. 550 (1910). Cf. In re Hessler's Estate, 79 Neb. 691, 113 N.W. 147 
(1907). 
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accounts to be made at the time of the transaction, and partly by analogy 
to the rule that the intent of the advancor at the time of the transfer 
controls. Relying on these reasons, the courts hold that where an 
advancement is charged in the manner required by statute, subsequent 
oral declarations of the intestate are not admissible to prove that an 
absolute gift was intended. 302 
If a parent charges a child with an advancement as required by 
statute and subsequently destroys the writing, his act changes the ad-
vancement to an absolute gift.303 Likewise, if the writing making the 
charge was always in the advancor' s possession, and is not found in 
his papers at his death, the writing is presumed to have been destroyed 
by him and the child cannot be charged with an advancement.304 
In Hartwell 11. Rice,3°5 a father charged an advancement to his 
daughter in the manner required by statute. Subsequently, he exe-
cuted a will in which he converted the advancement to an absolute 
gift. Later he_ revoked the_ will and died intestate. It was held that 
the will, since it never took effect, did not extinguish the advancement. 
The court also pointed out that if the making of the will showed a 
desire to extinguish the advancement, the cancelling of the will in-
dicated a change of that purpose. 
The Massachusetts statute, like several others, provides that a child 
may be charged with an advancement where it is acknowledged as such 
by him. In Fitts 11. Morse,306 the court of that state was called upon to 
construe that part of the statute. In that case, the children of an in-
testate agreed, during his lifetime, that money owed by some of them 
to him should be treated as advancements in the settlement of his estate. 
The intestate did not approve of the agreement. It was held that this 
was not an acknowledgment of an advancement as required by statute. 
VII 
PRESUMPTIONS 
A. The Majority Rule 
In an earlier part of this monograph, we saw that the intent of the 
transferor determines whether a conveyance is an advancement or a 
302 Bulkeley v. Noble, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 337 (1824); Fellows v. Little, 46 N.H. 27 
(1865); Weatherhead v. Field, 26 Vt. 665 (1854). 
303 Marshall v. Coleman, 89 Ill. App. 41 (1899), modified 187 Ill. 556, 58 N.E. 628 
(1900). 
-304Jhid. 
305 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 587 (1854). 
306 103 Mass. 164 (1869). See also In re Sipchen's Estate, 180 Wis. 504, 193 N.W. 
385 (1923). 
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gift.307 Often property is transferred by a parent to a child without 
any outward manifestations of intent on the part of the former. Since 
the advancement statutes have not created a statutory presumption to 
enable the courts to determine the intent of the advancor, they have 
made their own presumption. 308 That presumption is that all sub-
stantial voluntary transfers are prima facie ~dvancements. 309 
The basis of the rule is that the natural affection of a parent is as 
strong for one child as for another. Therefore, in the distribution of 
his property he will treat all of his children equally and fairly so that 
all of them will share equally in his estate, not only in what remains 
at his death, but equally in all that comes from him.310 
The Supreme Court of Iowa has demonstrated the reason for the 
rule under discussion by use of the following example. Suppose one 
child has married and his father gives him eighty acres of land. Later, 
when the second son also weds, a similar gift is made. However, the 
father may die before all of his children have received such a gift. 
Under such circumstances he undoubtedly intended for all of them 
to share equally. If the conveyances made by him in his lifetime are 
not charged as advancements, the older children who received the 
property inherit more than the younger ones. Therefore, by pre-
suming that pe intended to charge the children with advancements, 
a just result is reached.311 
An analysis of that example shows that the court was merely doing 
307 Supra p. 231. 
308 Johnson v. Belden, 20 Conn. 322 (1850); Packard v. Packard, 95 Kan. 644, 149 
P. 404 (1915). 
309Watt v. Lee, 238 Ala. 451, 191 S. 628 (1939); Dent v. Foy, 206 Ala. 454, 90 
S. 317 (1921), 210 Ala. 475, 98 S. 390 (1923); Clements Admr. v. Hood, 57 Ala. 459 
(1876); Rumbly v. Stainton, 24 Ala. 712 (1854); Smith's Guardian v. Smith's Admrs., 
21 Ala. 761 (1852); Goodwin v. Parnell, 69 Ark. 629, 65 S.W. 427 (1901); Sewell v. 
Everett, 57 Fla. 529, 49 S. 187 (1910); Neal v. Neal, 153 Ga. 44, 111 S.E. 387 (1922); 
Howard v. Howard, 101 Ga. 224, 28 S.E. 648 (1897); Wenbert v. Lincoln Nat. Bank and 
Trust Co., 116 Ind. App. 31, 61 N.E. (2d) 466 (1945); Culp v. Wilson, 133 Ind. 294, 
32 N.E. 928 (1893); Ruch Admr. v. Biery, llO Ind. 444, 11 N.E. 312 (1887); In re 
Wiese's Estate, 222 Iowa 935, 270 N.W. 380 (1936); Fell v. Bradshaw, 205 Iowa 100, 
215 N.W. 595 (1927); In re Sell's Estate, 197 Iowa 696, 197 N.W. 922 (1924); O'Con-
nell v. O'Connell, 73 Iowa 733, 36 N.W. 764 (1887); Burns v. Burns, 87 Kan. 19, 123 
P. 720 (1912); Pilkington v. Wheat, 330 Mo. 767, 51 S.W. (2d) 42 (1932); Pitts v. 
Metzger, 195 Mo. App. 677, 187 S.W. 610 (1916); Ray v. Loper, 65 Mo. 470 (1877); 
Gordon v. Barkelew, 6 N.J. Eq. (2 Halst.) 94 (1874); Kintz v. Friday, 4 Dem. Sur. (N.Y.) 
540 (1886); Thompson v. Smith, 160 N.C. 256, 75 S.E. 1010 (1912); Ex Parte Griffin, 
142 N.C. 116, 54 S.E. 1007 (1906); Storey's Appeal, 83 Pa. 89 (1887); Johnson's Admr. 
v. Patterson, 81 Tenn. (13 Lea) 626 (1884); Morris v. Morris, 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.) 814 
(1872); Poff v. Poff, 128 Va. 62, 104 S.E. 719 (1920); Johnson v. Mundy, 123 Va. 730, 
97 S.E. 564 (1918). 
310 Goodwin v. Parnell, 69 Ark. 629, 65 S.W. 427 (1901); Plowman v. Nicholson, 
81 Kan. 215, 105 P. 692 (1909). 
311 Bash v. Bash, 182 Iowa 55, 165 N.W. 399 (1917). 
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what it thought the intestate worild have done had he considered the 
problem. The statute of distributions makes a will for a person who 
dies intestate. Like the statute of distributions, the courts, in creating 
the presumption, are doing what they believe the intestate would have 
done if he had executed a will on the day of his death. The scope and 
operation of that prima facie presumption is to cast upon the party 
against whom it operates, the duty of introducing sufficient evidence 
to rebut it. However, the authors of the Model Probate Code take a 
different view of the problem. They have reversed the presumption 
so that "every gratuitous inter vivas transfer is deemed to be an absolute 
gift and not an advancement unless shown to be an advancement."312 
Their view is shared by the Texas court and by the Connecticut court 
where the transfer is of personal property. 
B. The Texas Rule 
Since Texas is a community property state, the writer was inclined 
to believe that its courts would hold that a transfer by a parent to a 
child would, on the former' s death, be presumed to be an advance-
ment. However, the courts of that state hold that the presumption is 
one of absolute gift. They merely place the burden of proof on the 
party alleging that a voluntary transfer is an advancement: The theory 
of those decisions is that if the parent intended his children to share 
equally in his separate estate, he would attach conditions to the gift 
so it would be an advancement, or that failing so to provide, he cer-
tainly would have taken care of the matter by will. Therefore, if he 
elects not to follow either of the above methods, the only reasonable 
assumption is that he did not intend for his children to share equally 
in his estate at his death.313 The Texas decisions do not require that 
312 S1:MEs AND BAsYB, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAw 65-68 (1946). 
318 Andrews v. Brown, (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 283 S.W. 288, affd. (Tex. Civ. App. 
1928) 10 S.W. (2d) 707; Rutherford v. Deaver, (Tex. Comm. App. 1921) 235 S.W. 
853, reversing Rutherford v. Deaver, (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 218 S.W. 31. In that case 
the court of appeals held that a deed from a parent to a child in consideration of love and 
affection is on the farmer's death deemed an advancement. The court did not rely on other 
Texas advancement decisions, but on a quotation from Carpus Juris and the Texas cases 
of Landrum v. Landrum, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 130 S.W. 907 (1910), and Lott v. 
Kaiser, 61 Tex. 665 (1884). Those cases did not involve the doctrine in its technical 
sense. In both cases the question to be determined was whether the purchase of property 
by a parent in his child's name was a resulting trust. On appeal, the Court of Commission 
Appeals reversed because the decision of the court was not in accord with Texas law. 
Smart v. Panther, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 262, 95 S.W. 679 (1906); Sparks v. Spence, 40 Tex. 
694 (1874). In that case the court held that property conveyed by a father to a child 
after the death of the farmer's wife is presumed to be an advancement. That decision is 
based on the Texas law of community property. 
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the advancement be expressed in writing before it can be charged as 
such but merely place the burden of proof on the party claiming that 
a gift from a parent to a child is an advancement.314 
C. The Connecticut Rule 
In Connecticut, the relationship of parent and child is not sufficient 
to give rise to the presumption that the delivery of a chattel or money 
by the one to the other is an advancement. The court feels that a 
parent may be liberal with a child without placing him under future 
accountability to his estate and that he may discriminate in his favor 
if he chooses. If he intended to charge the personal property as an 
advancement, he must evidence that intention by some method beyond 
the unexplained act of delivering the property to the child. If the 
intestate explicitly declares that a voluntary inter vivos transfer of per-
sonal property is an advancement, the Connecticut court would hold 
that the child must account for it.315 In that state, a gift of real estate 
by a parent to a child is prima facie an advancement.316 
D. The Kentucky and South Carolina Rule 
In Kentucky, by statute, and in South Carolina, by judicial de-
cision, the intent of the advancor is disregarded and all substantial gifts 
are advancements.317 In both jurisdictions, the person claiming that 
a child has received an advancement has the burden of proving that 
the transfer was a gift rather than a loan, debt or resulting trust. If he 
proves that the transfer was a gift, the courts hold that it is an advance-
314 Andrews v. Brown, supra note 313. Cf. Lindley v. Lindley, (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) 
178 S.W. 782. In that case a father deeded land to his daughter. The deed recited a 
consideration of $1000 which was to be credited against her share of the estate. Held, that 
she should be charged with the sum of $1000 as an advancement. 
315 Johnson v. Belden, 20 Conn. 322 (1850); Kemp v. Turman, 104 Miss. 501, 61 
S. 548 (1913). In that case the Supreme Court of Mississippi said that a gift of personal 
property, unless it is money to be used to purchase real estate, is prima facie a gift. That 
statement was dictum because the court held that the evidence was sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of advancement. The court based this dictum on its inability to find a case 
holding that such a transfer was prima facie an advancement. However, in Whitfield v. 
Whitfield, 40 Miss. 352 (1856), the court had held that a voluntary inter vivos transfer 
of personal property was an advancement. In view of that decision the Mississippi court in 
all probability will not follow the dictum of Kemp v. Turman, supra this note. 
816 Hatch v. Straight, 3 Conn. 31 (1819). 
817 Supra pp. 234, 236. That rule is subject to an exception in both jurisdictions. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1948) §391.140 reads in part as follows: "The maintaining, or educating 
or giving of money, to a child or grandchild, without any view toward a portion or settle-
ment in life, shall not be deemed an advancement." In White v. Moore, 23 S.C. 456 
(1885), the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that money expended for a medical 
education was not an advancement. 
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ment.318 For instance, in White v. Moore,319 a parent loaned his son 
money and took a note for the amount due. On the father's death 
intestate, because the note was barred by limitations, the other children 
claimed that the amount loaned was an advancement. The court ruled 
that the children claiming that the transaction was an advancement had 
the burden of proof. 
In Farmer's Exchange Bank of Millersburg v. Moflett,320 a parent 
loaned his son money and took a note for the amount due. On the 
father's death, a creditor attached the son's interest in the estate and 
the son claimed that he had agreed with his father that the note should 
be treated as an advancement. 321 The court held that the burden of 
proving that the transfer was an advancement was on the son. 
E. The Louisiana Rule 
Louisiana follows the civil law doctrine of collation. Under that 
doctrine, collation must take place if the advancor has formally ordered 
it, or if he has remained silent on the subject.322 When the advancor 
formally expresses his will that what he gave the advancee was intended 
as an advantage or extra part, collation does not take place, unless the 
value of the article given exceeds the disposable portion, in which case 
the excess must be accounted for.323 
The declaration that the gift or legacy is made as an extra portion 
may be made (1) in the instrument making the disposition or (2) 
afterwards by an instrument executed before a notary public and two 
witnesses 324 or by the advancor' s will. 325 
VIII 
TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY GIVING RISE TO THE PRESUMPTION OF 
ADVANCEMENT 
In a leading English case, Sir G. Jessel said that " ... nothing 
could be more productive of misery in families than . . . to hold that 
318 Proctor v. Proctor, 282 Ky. 20, 137 S.W. (2d) 354 (1940); Farmer's Exchange 
Bank of Millersburg v. Moffett, 256 Ky. 160, 75 S.W. (2d) 1063 (1934); White v. 
Moore, 23 S.C. 456 (1885). 
319 23 s.c. 456 (1885). 
320 256 Ky. 160, 75 S.W. (2d) 1063 (1934). 
321 In that case it was to the son's advantage if the transaction were an advancement. 
Otherwise, he would owe the estate nine hundred dollars. The case was reversed because 
the son was permitted to testify in violation of the Kentucky Dead Man's Statute. 
322 La. Civ. Code Ann. (1945) art. 1230. 
323 Id., § 1231. 
324 Id., §1232. 
325 Id., §1233; Darby v. Darby, 118 La. 328, 42 S. 953 (1907). 
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every member of the family must account strictly for every sum re-
ceived from a parent."326 Accordingly, the courts hold that all volun-
tary inter vivos transfers are not necessarily advancements. In deter-
mining whether a transaction is an advancement, the courts consider 
many factors. At this point, it is advisable to consider the various types 
of transfers giving rise to the presumption. 
A. Money or Property Given to a Child to Start Him in Business 
If a parent gives a child money for the purpose of establishing or 
enlarging a business, the courts hold that the money is given for the 
purpose of establishing the child in life and is therefore presumed to 
be an advancement. 327 
A gift of property of little value may be charged as an advancement 
if given for establishing a child in life. For instance, in Ison v. Ison/28 
a parent transferred a stallion to his son to be used to beget foals. When 
the father died intestate the other heirs sought to charge this as an 
advancement. The purported advancee claimed that this was a mere 
present, so trilling in nature that it should not be charged as a part 
portion. The court held that the value of the stallion, since it was 
bestowed on the child with a view toward settlement in life, should be 
charged to him on the distribution of his father's estate. 
However, a gift of substantial value given to establish a child in 
business is not necessarily an advancement. In Dent v. Foy, 329 a very 
wealthy parent made several voluntary inter vivos transfers to all of 
his children, some of which were given to establish the child in busi-
ness. The court held that the sums so received were not advance-
ments because they were not intended as such by the intestate. From 
this example we see that the intent of the advancor or donor governs, 
even though the property was given to establish the children in busi-
ness, and if he intended an absolute gift, the courts will follow his 
wishes. Of course, in those jurisdictions where the intent of the ad-
vancor is regarded as immaterial, all voluntary inter vivos transfers of 
money or property given to establish a child in life are advancements. 
326Taylor v. Taylor, L.R. 20 Eq. 155 at 158 (1875). 
327 Mitchell's Distributees v. Mitchell's Admr., 8 Ala. 414 (1845); Page v. Elwell, 
81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927); McDonald v. McDonald, 86 Mo. App. 122 (1900); 
Shiver v. Brock, 55 N.C. (2 Jones Eq.) 137 (1855); Ison v. Ison, 5 Rich Eq. (S.C.) 15 
(1852). 
328 5 Rich Eq. (S.C.) 15 (1852). Cf. Shiver v. Brock, 55 N.C. (2 Jones Eq.) 137 
(1855). In that case a horse, some cows and hogs, a bed, some chairs, a table, some broom-
com and lard amounting in value to $299 given by a parent to a daughter, was held 
chargeable as an advancement. 
829 206 Ala. 454, 90 S. 317 (1921), 210 Ala. 475, 98 S. 390 (1923). 
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B. Marriage Portion 
On a daughter's marriage, her father may give her a wedding pres-
ent. Usually such gifts are substantial and the other children, on the 
parent's death intestate, seek to charge the property so given as an 
advancement. The courts view such a transfer as being made for the 
purpose of establishing her in life and hold that it should be charged 
to her as an advancement.330 However, the presumption is rebuttable, 
and if the parent intended to make an absolute gift, his wishes will be 
followed.331 In those jurisdictions where the intent of the advancor 
is regarded as immaterial, all substantial voluntary inter vivos transfers 
by a father to a daughter on the latter's marriage are advancements. 
C. Property of Trifling Value 
Should a child be charged with an advancement where the prop-
erty transferred by the parent to him is of small or trilling value? The 
answer to this question must be in the negative. 332 The reason that 
a mere trifling sum is not sufficient to give rise to the presumption of 
advancement is that the inconsequence of the matter on its face rebuts 
the presumption.333 However, whether or not a trilling present or 
gift is to be charged as an advancement depends largely on circum-
stances. For instance, a horse and rig, given by a parent to a child 
for the latter's pleasure, has been held not to be an advancement.334 
However, in another case, a stallion given by a parent to a child for 
the purpose of agriculture has been held to be an advancement.335 
330 Wenbert v. Lincoln Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 116 Ind. App. 31, 61 N.E. (2d) 
466 (1945). In that case an intestate gave his daughter common stock as a wedding 
present. Held, that the gift was an advancement. Hollister Admr. v. Attmore, 58 N.C. 
(5 Jones Eq.) 373 (1860). In that case household furniture given a daughter as a wedding 
present was charged as an advancement. Carter's Exr. v. Rutland, 2 N.C. (I Hayw.) 97 
(1794). In that case the court said: "When a man sends property with his daughter upon 
her marriage, or to his son-in-law and daughter any short time after the marriage, it is to 
be presumed prima facie, that the property is given absolutely in advancement to his 
daughter •.•. " Cf. Johnson v. Belden, 20 Conn. 322 (1850). In that case the court held 
that household property valued at more than $500 given by a father to his daughter was 
not an advancement. The decision was based on the Connecticut rule that gifts of personal 
property are never prima facie advancements. 
331 King's Estate, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 370 (1841). In that case a very wealthy father gave 
his daughter furniture worth $1132 as a wedding present. Held, that the wealth of the 
father showed that he did not intend to make an advancement. 
332Griggs v. Love, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 175 (1891). In that case a diamond ring given 
by a parent to a child was held to be a gift. Meadows v. Meadows, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 
148 (1850); M'Caw v. Blewit, 2 McCord Eq. (S.C.) 90 (1827); Mitchell's Distributees 
v. Mitchell, 8 Ala. 414 (1845); McDonald v. McDonald, 86 Mo. App. 122 (1900). 
333 McDonald v. McDonald, 86 Mo. App. 122 (1900). 
334 M'Caw v. Blewit, 2 McCord Eq. (S.C.) 90 (1827). 
835 McDonald v. McDonald, supra note 333; Ison v. Ison, 5 Rich. Eq. (S.C.) 15 
(1852); M'Caw v. Blewit, supra note 334. 
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The distinction in the cases is that one was given for the mere gratifica-
tion of the child, whereas the other was given for the purpose of 
establishing the child in life. 
In determining whether a small gift should be charged as an ad-
vancement the wealth of the parent must also be considered. The 
gift of a horse or a cow by an opulent person is not as persuasive evi-
dence of an advancement as if he were poor.336 
In South Carolina and Kentucky, where the intent of the advancor 
is immaterial, a gift of small or trifling value is not considered an 
advancement. 337 
D. When a Parent Sells Property to a Child 
A child may approach his father and ask him to sell certain prop-
erty to him. If the parties agree on a price that is fair and adequate 
and the amount agreed on is actually paid, the transaction is a sale. 
Therefore, on the parent's death intestate, the value of the property 
cannot be charged to the child as an advancement.338 Many times 
the problem is not that easy to solve. For instance, the agreed price 
may be less than the actual value of the property or the deed may recite 
consideration that has not, in fact, been paid. In both of these situa-
tions, if the parent dies intestate, the doctrine of advancements plays 
a very important role. 
I. When the Consideration Paid Is Not Equal to the Value of 
the Property Conveyed. Often a parent conveys real estate to a child 
for love and affection and a nominal consideration, i.e., one to twenty-
five dollars. Under such circumstances, courts are not warranted in 
finding that the transfer was a sale and accordingly the presumption 
is one of advancement.339 
If a parent conveys property worth $5000 to a child for a con-
sideration of $?000, should the difference in value be charged to the 
child as an advancement? The vast majority of cases hold that it 
should be charged as such because to hold otherwise would defeat the 
336 McDonald v. McDonald, supra note 333; M'Caw v. Blewit, supra note 334. 
337 Griggs v. Lane, supra note 332. 
338 Holland v. Bonner, 142 Ark. 214, 218 S.W. 665 (1920); Stauffer v. Martin, 43 
Ind. App. 675, 88 N.E. 363 (1909); Ex parte Barefoot, 201 N.C. 393, 160 S.E. 365 
(1931); Nobles v. Davenport, 183 N.C. 207, 111 S.E. 180 (1922); Kiger v. Terry, 119 
N.C. 456, 26 S.E. 38 (1896); Osborne v. Richmond, 131 Va. 261, 108 S.E. 560 (1921); 
Edwards v. Freeman, 2 P. Wms. 436, 24 Eng. Rep. 803 (1727). In that case the court 
said at 808: " ... if the child had been a purchaser, or creditor of the father, it could not 
be intended, that what was the child's purchase or debt should be brought into hotchpot." 
339 Parks v. Parks, 19 Md. 323 (1863). In that case the consideration was love and 
affection and $25. See Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N.C. 654, 50 S.E. (2d) 901 (1948). 
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very equality in the distribution of a parent's estate among his children 
that the statute is designed to protect.840 However, where the con-
sideration paid is nearly equal in value to the property conveyed, the 
courts hold the transaction to be a sale.841 
In Tennessee, the court holds that a sale by a father to a son is not 
an advancement in part merely because the consideration is inade-
quate. 842 The reason for those decisions is that a court will not weigh 
in "golden scales" the dealings between parent and child or declare 
what both parties intended as a sale to be an advancement upon proof 
merely of inadequacy of consideration.848 
2. When a Deed Recites a Consideration That Has Not Been 
Paid. Often a parent, in deeding property to a child, instructs the 
person drawing the deed to insert a specified sum as the consideration 
paid. The parties do not intend for the sum to be paid and it is not 
paid. On the parent's death intestate, the other children, seeking to 
show advancements, may have to prove that the recited consideration 
was not paid. If the deed is in consideration of love and affection and 
a nominal consideration, no difficulty is presented, the presumption 
being one of advancement.844 However, if the consideration recited 
is substantial, the child receiving the property will claim that to permit 
a showing that it was not in fact paid is violative of the parol evidence 
rule. 
In all states but Vermont,845 the courts hold that to permit a show-
ing that the consideration was not paid for the purpose of proving an 
840 Mossestad v. Gunderson, 140 Iowa 290, 118 N.W. 374 (i908); Gossage v. 
Gossage's Admr., 281 Ky. 575, 136 S.W. (2d) 775 (1940); Powell's Heirs v. Powell's 
Heirs, 35 Ky. (5 Dana) 168 (1837); Stewart v. State, 2 Har. and G. (Md.) 114 (1828). 
In that case the court pointed out that there is no presumption that the price paid for the 
property was inadequate. Mumford v. Mumford, (Mo. App. 1917) 194 S.W. 898; Ex 
parte Barefoot, 201 N.C. 393, 160 S.E. 365 (1931); In re O'Hara's Estate, 204 Iowa 1331, 
217 N.W. 245 (1928). In that case the consideration for the conveyance was $12,000 and 
the child's agreement to support his father for life. The father died very shortly thereafter. 
Held, that the transaction was a sale. 
841 Kiger v. Terry, 119 N.C. 456, 26 S.E. 38 (1896). 
342 Merriman Admr. v. Lacefield, 51 Tenn. (4 Heisk.) 209 (1871). 
348 Ibid. 
344 Hatch v. Straight, 3 Conn. 31 (1819); Parks v. Parks, 19 Md. 323 (1863); Scott 
v. Scott, 1 Mass. 527 (1805); Ex parte Griffin, 142 N.C. 116, 54 S.E. 1007 (1906); 
Sayles v. Baker, 5 R.I. 457 (1858). In that case the court held that a conveyance for love 
and affection was conclusively an advancement. The court pointed out that if the recited 
consideration is love and affection and a nominal sum the presumption is one of advance-
ment. 
345 Adams v. Adams, 22 Vt. 50 (1849). Also in accord with this case is the Missouri 
case of Yates v. Burt, 161 Mo. App. 267, 143 S.W. 73 (1912). That case was overruled 
by implication in the following Missouri cases: Pilkington v. Wheat, 330 Mo. 767, 51 
S.W. (2d) 610 (1916); Gobel v. Kitchen, 217 Mo. App. 354, 266 S.W. 992 (1924); 
Lynch v. Culver, 260 Mo. 495, 168 S.W. 1138 (1914). 
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advancement does not violate the parol evidence rule. 346 The reason 
for such holdings is that the heirs seeking to charge the transfer as an 
advancement are not seeking to impeach or defeat the title transferred 
by the conveyance, but merely to prove that an advancement was in-
tended. 
The recital of consideration places the burden of proving that an 
advancement was intended on the party alleging such to be the case.350 
If the grantee in the deed admits that the consideration was not paid, 
the presumption is one of advancement.351 
Earlier in this monograph we saw that in some states a transfer of 
property cannot be charged as an advancement unless evidenced by a 
writing. In those jurisdictions, proof that the consideration was not 
paid does not aid the party claiming advancement because there is no 
writing charging the transfer as such.352 
E. When a Parent Purchases Property in the Name of a Child 
When a person pays the purchase money for real property, but 
takes title in the name of a stranger, the courts hold that the party 
taking the legal title holds it in trust for the one who paid the purchase 
price.353 However, where a parent purchases real estate and takes 
title in the name of a child, the transaction is presumed to be an ad-
vancement or gift rather than a resulting trust.354 The basis of the 
rule is that the parent makes the conveyance in consideration of some 
legal or moral obligation to his family.355 
Most cases on this point do not involve the doctrine of advance-
ments. In these cases a parent purchased the property in a child's 
name and, after a dispute with the latter, sought to recover the prop-
346 Meeker v. Meeker, 16 Conn. 383 (1844); Finch v. Garrett, 102 Iowa 381, 71 
N.W. 429 (1897); Burton v. Baldwin, 61 Iowa 283, 16 N.W. 110 (1883); McCray v. 
Com, 168 Ky. 457, 182 S.W. 640 (1916); Crafton v. Inge, 124 Ky. 89, 98 S.W. 325 
(1906); Gordon's Heirs v. Gordon, 58 Ky. (I Mete.) 285 (1858); Parks v. Parks, 19 Md. 
323 (1863); Pilkington v. Wheat, supra note 345; Gobel v. Kitchen, supra note 345; 
Lynch v. Culver, supra note 345; Speer v. Speer, 14 N.J. Eq. 240 (1862); Bruce v. 
Slemp, 82 Va. 352, 4 S.E. 692 (1886). 
347-340 omitted.-Ed. 
350 Day v. Grubbs, 235 Ky. 741, 32 S.W. (2d) 327 (1930); Pilkington v. Wheat, 
supra note 345. 
351 Lynch v. Culver, supra note 345; Gobel v. Kitchen, supra note 345. 
352 Supra pp. 244-248. 
353 McCafferty v. Flinn, 14 Del. Ch. 307, 125 A. 675 (1924); Hall v. Hall, 107 Mo. 
101, 17 s.w. 811 (1891). 
354Bogy v. Roberts, 48 Ark. 17, 2 S.W. 186 (1886); Robinson v. Robinson, 45 Ark. 
481 (1885); Brown v. Burke, 22 Ga. 574 (1857); Hall v. Hall, supra note 353; Page v. 
Page, 8 N.H. 187 (1836); Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 185, 181 A. 689 (1935); Landrum v. 
Landrum, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 130 S.W. 907 (1910). 
855 McCafferty v. Flinn, supra note 353; Hall v. Hall, supra note 353. 
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erty on the theory that a resulting trust was intended.356 The courts 
are very reluctant to permit a parent to recover in such a case. For 
that reason they hold that a resulting trust must be established by 
strong, unequivocal and convincing evidence.357 
These cases are of some value in determining whether the purchase 
of property in the name of a child is an advancement. If the parent 
cannot recover the property and later dies intestate, the courts are called 
upon to determine whether the transaction is an advancement or gift. 
Under such circumstances they hold that. the presumption is one of 
advancement. 358 
The property purchased in the child's riame may constitute a large 
portion of the parent's estate. For that reason, other heirs will claim 
that the transfer was a resulting trust. In the jurisdictions that have 
been called upon to pass on this problem, the courts hold that the 
presumption is one of advancement.359 
356 Stacy v. Stacy, 175 Ark. 763, 300 S.W. 437 (1927); Bogy v. Roberts, supra note 
354; Cotton v. Citizen's Bank, 97 Ark. 568, 135 S.W. 340 (1911); Robinson v. Robinson, 
supra note 354; Faylor v. Faylor, 136 Cal. 92, 68 P. 482 (1902); McCafferty v. Flinn, 
supra note 353; Mott v. Iossa, supra note 354; Hall v. Hall, supra note 353; Page v. Page, 
supra note 354; Creed v. Lancaster Bank, 1 Ohio St. 1 (1852); Dudley v. Bos.vorth, 29 
Tenn. (10 Humph.) 9 (1848); Thompson's Heirs v. Thompson's Devisees, 9 Tenn. (1 
Yerg.) 97 (1826); Hamilton v. Bradley, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 127 (1818). 
357Bogy v. Roberts, 48 Ark. 17, 2 S.W. 186 (1886); Brown v. Burke, 22 Ga. 574 
(1857); Brennaman v. Schell, 212 lli. 356, 72 N.E. 412 (1904); Bay v. Cook, 31 lli. 336 
(1863). In that case a creditor claimed that a transfer by a parent to a son was a resulting 
trust. The court found that the conveyance was made to avoid a prospective liability and 
held that a resulting trust was created. Taylor v. Taylor, 9 lli. (4 Gilman) 303 (1847); 
Culp v. Price, 107 Iowa 133, 77 N.W. 848 (1899); Hunnell v. Zinn, (Mo. Supp. 1916) 
184 S.W. 1154. In that case the court held that the fact that the parent received part 
of the rents and was consulted as to the making of improvements was not sufficient to rebut 
the presumption of advancement. Jackson v. Matsdorf, 11 Johns. (N.Y.) 91 (1814); 
Catoe v. Catoe, 32 S.C. 595, 10 S.E. 1078 (1890); Dudley v. Bosworth, 29 Tenn. (10 
Humph.) 9 (1848). Cases holding that the evidence was insufficient to rebut the pre-
sumption of advancement: Bogy v. Roberts, supra this note. In that case a parent purchased 
property in the name of a child. The parent took possession, made improvements and 
received the rents and profits. Held, that this evidence was not sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of advancement. Eastham v. Powell, 51 Ark. 530, 11 S.W. 823 (1889); 
McCafferty v. Flinn, 14 Del. Ch. 307, 125 A. 675 (1924); Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 
185, 181 A. 689 (1935). In that case a stepfather purchased real estate in the name of 
a stepson. Subsequently, he discovered that his marriage to the child's mother was void. 
Held, that this evidence was insufficient to show that a resulting trust was intended. 
Astreen v. Flanagan, 3 Ed. Ch. (N.Y.) 279 (1839). 
358Taylor v. Taylor, 9 lli. (4 Gilman) 303 (1847); Scott v. Harris, 127 Ind. 520, 27 
N.E. 150 (1891); Barth v. Severson, 191 Iowa 770, 183 N.W. 617 (1921); Ellis v. 
Newell, 120 Iowa 71, 94 N.W. 463 (1910); Hunnell v. Zinn, (Mo. Supp. 1916) 184 
s.w. 1154. 
359 Barth v. Severson, supra note 358; Hunnell v. Zinn, supra note 358. 
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F. When a Child Purchases Property In His Name with His Parent's 
Money 
Suppose a parent gives a child money to purchase real estate with 
the understanding that title is to be taken in the parent's name. If 
the child, in violation of this agreement, takes title to the property in 
his own name, the other heirs, on the parent's death, may claim the 
transaction was a resulting trust rather than an advancement. The 
only cases involving this problem are not advancement cases. In those 
cases the parent discovered what had taken place and sued the child 
to establish a resulting trust. In these cases, the court held that the 
child holds the property as trustee for his father.360 If the parent dis-
covers that the child has purchased the property in his own name and 
if he does not object, the courts hold that he intended to make a gift 
to the child and on his death intestate, the value of the property is 
deemed an advancement to the child. 361 If the parent did not discover 
the facts prior to his death, the courts would undoubtedly hold that 
the property was held by the child as trustee for his parent. 
G. When a Parent Pays a Note He Has Signed as Surety for a Child 
Many times an adult person borrows money and in doing so he 
is required to have a surety on his note. If a parent is :financially 
acceptable he often signs as surety and, on his son's default, is com-
pelled to pay the debt. If he dies intestate and does not collect the 
money so paid, the other cl}ildren may seek to charge the amount he 
paid to discharge his suretyship obligation as an advancement. At 
the same time, the child receiving the money may want it treated as 
a debt because the indebtedness is barred by limitations. The authori-
ties are divided. Some courts treat the transaction as one where the 
father has voluntarily paid the debt of the son and presume that it 
is an advancement.362 Other courts have recognized the fallacy of this 
360 Moore v. Scruggs, 131 Iowa 692, 109 N.W. 205 (1906); Peer v. Peer, 11 N.J. 
Eq. (3 Stockton) 432 (1857). 
361 Douglass v. Brice, 4 Rich Eq. (S.C.) 322 (1852); Gregory v. Winston's Admr., 
23 Grat. (Va.) 102 (1873). 
362Wood v. Knotts, 196 Iowa 544, 194 N.W. 953 (1923); Reynolds Admrs. v. 
Reynolds, 92 Ky. 556, 18 S.W. 517 (1892); Haglar v. McCombs, 66 N.C. 345 (1872); 
Huffman v. Ramey, 157 Tenn. 183, 15 S.W. (2d) 746 (1928); Steele Admr. v. Friarson, 
85 Tenn. 430, 3 S.W. 649 (1887); Johnson v. Hoyle, 40 Tenn. 56 (1859). 
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line of reasoning and hold that it is a debt.363 The theory of these 
decisions is that the parent, in his lifetime, did not give up the right to 
sue the child for indemnity and that the debt, therefore, never became 
an advancement.364 If the father, at the time of payment, indicates 
that he intends to treat the transaction as an advancement, the courts 
respect that desire.365 But if he attempts to change the transaction 
from a debt to an advancement at a later date in order to prevent his 
claim from being barred by limitations, the courts refuse to follow his 
intention unless he expressed that desire in the presence of the child 
and the latter did not object to the change.366 
The cases adhering to the view that if a father as surety pays a debt 
of a son, the transaction is an advancement, are, in the opinion of the 
writer, unsound. It is obvious that the requirement of a gift is not 
present since the father could sue the son at once on the theory of 
indemnity. Until he relinquishes that right, the transaction should 
be treated as a debt. 
H. When a Parent Takes a Note or Security for NI.oney Paid a Child 
A child may ask his parent for a substantial sum of money and 
give him a note or mortgage or both. On the parent's death intestate, 
the other heirs, if the note or mortgage is barred by limitations, will 
claim that the transaction is an advancement. The child, in order to 
save interest, may claim that it was a part portion or he may, if the 
parent died testate, claim that an advancement was intended. The 
courts hold that the presumption is one of debt.367 In the event of 
litigation, one of the parties always contends that parol evidence is not · 
admissible to prove that the transaction was an advancement.368 How-
ever, the rule is well settled that parol evidence is admissible to prove 
363 In re Hutman's Estate, 30 Pittsbg. (Pa.). Leg. J. 385 (1883); In re Buchanan's 
Estate, 2 Chest. Co. (Pa.) Rep. 74 (1883); Levering v. Rittenhouse, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 130 
(1839). 
364 Note 360 supra. 
365 Treadwell v. Everett, 185 Ga. 454, 195 S.E. 762 (1938); In re Buchanan's 
Estate, supra note 363; McDearman v. Hodnett, 83 Va. 281, 2 S.E. 643 (1887). Cf. 
Wood v. Knotts, 196 Iowa 544, 194 N.W. 953 (1923). 
366 Note 363 supra. 
367 Haines v. Christie, 28 Colo. 502, 66 P. 883 (1901); Barron v. Barron, 181 Ga. 
505, 182 S.E. 851 (1935); Russell v. Smith, 115 Iowa 261, 88 N.W. 361 (1901); Guar-
antee Title and Trust Co. v. Siedhoff, 144 Kan. 13, 58 P. (2d) 66 (1936); Bowman's 
Admrs. v. Bowman's Exr., 301 Ky. 694, 192 S.W. (2d) 955 (1946); Sprague v. Moore, 
130 Mich. 92, 89 N.W. 712 (1902); Overholser v. Wright, 17 Ohio St. 157 '(1866); In 
re Morris' Estate, 356 Pa. 497, 52 A. (2d) 172 (1947); In re Jones' Estate, 29 Pittsb. (Pa.) 
Leg. Jr. 89 (1881); High's Appeal, 21 Pa. (9 Harris) 283 (1853); House v. Woodard, 
45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 196 (1867); Vaden Admr. v. Hance, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 300 (1858). 
368 Grey's Heirs v. Grey's Admrs., 22 Ala. 233 (1853); Cutliff v. Boyd, 72 Ga. 302 
(1884); Sadler v. Huffhines, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 670, 12 S.W. 715 (1889). 
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that an advancement was intended.369 Before the court will hold that 
an ,advancement was intended, the evidence must be clear and con-
vincing.310 
In jurisdictions which require all advancements to be evidenced 
by a charge in writing, parol evidence is not admissible to show that 
a note or mortgage is an advancement. 371 
I. When a Parent Refers to the Transaction as a Gi~ 
A parent may give property to a child and refer to it as a gift. In 
Rowe 11. Rowe,372 a son stated that his parent, at the time he transferred 
property to him, said that it was given '\.vithout strings tied to it" and 
the gift was made to relieve the father of taxes as he wanted the son 
"to enjoy the property in his lifetime." The son claimed that the 
father's declarations were sufficient to rebut the presumption of ad-
vancement. The court held that the language was as consistent with 
an advancement as with a gift and that therefore the language was not 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of advancement. All other cases 
are in accord with that decision.373 
A child may accept a gift when he would refuse an advancement. 
If the parent refers to the transaction as a gift he probably intended it 
as such. If he intended an advancement he would have used appro-
priate language. People who are not trained in law do not know the 
technical legal meaning of these words. To charge them with the 
legal meaning of the words might run counter to their intention. Al-
though, from a technical point of view, the decisions of the courts may 
be correct, logical public policy dictates that the rule should be different. 
To a layman a gift is not an advancement and an advancement is not 
a gift. Therefore, if the parent calls the transaction a gift and the 
child accepts it as such, he should not be charged with an advancement. 
309 Buscher v. Knapp, 107 Ind. 340, 8 N.E. 263 (1886); Stovall v. Stovall's Admr., 
14 Ky. L. Rep. 668 (1893); Comer v. Grazens, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 668 (1893). Cf. Porter 
v. Porter, 51 Me. 376 (1862). 
370 Fennell v. Henry, 70 Ala. 484 (1881); Hindshaw v. Security Trust Co., 48 Ind. 
App. 351, 93 N.E. 567 (1911); Willetts v. Willetts, 19 Ind. 22 (1862); Harley v. Harley, 
57 Md. 340 (1882); Sadler v. Huffhines, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 670, 12 S.W. 715 (1889); 
Doty v. Doty, 155 Pa. St. 285, 26 A. 548 (1893); Merkel's Appeal, 89 Pa. 340 (1879); 
Jennings v. Jennings, 49 Tenn. (2 Heisk.) 283 (1871). 
371 Meppen v. Meppen, 392 ill. 30, 63 N.E. (2d) 755 (1946); Porter v. Porter, 51 
Me. 376 (1862); Lodge v. Fitch, 72 Neb. 652, 101 N.W. 338 (1904); Schmidt v. 
Schmidt's Estate, 123 Wis. 295, 101 N.W. 678 (1904). 
372 144 Va. 816, 130 S.E. 771 (1925). 
373 In re Sell's Estate, 197 Iowa 696, 197 N.W. 922 (1924); Lynch v. Culver, 260 
Mo. 495, 168 S.W. 1138 (1914); Dutch's Appeal, 57 Pa. (7 P. F. Smith) 461 (1868). 
See Laman v. Craig, 30 Tenn. App. 353, 206 S.W. (2d) 309 (1947). 
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J. When a Father-in-Law Transfers Property to a Son-in-Law 
A father-in-law may give money to, or pay bills owed by, a son-in-
law. On his death, the question may arise as to whether amounts so 
paid should be charged as advancements to his daughter. Three pos-
sibilities must be considered in solving this problem: (I) the advancor 
tells his son-in-law that the gift is intended as an advancement in his 
daughter's presence; (2) the father-in-law states it is an advancement 
and his daughter is not present; and (3) at the time of the transaction 
nothing is said about it being charged as an advancement. 
The £.rst possibility presents no difficulty since the transaction took 
place in the daughter's presence. She is deemed to have consented to 
having it charged to her as an advancement.374 The second and third 
possibilities, however, present a more complicated problem. Prior to the 
enactment of the married women's act, the courts held that a gift of 
personalty was an advancement but a gift of realty was not.376 The 
North Carolina court, in Banks v. Shannonhouse,376 expressed the 
reasons for the rule in the following quotation: 
"In our opinion there is a very essential difference. If personal 
property be given to a wife, it instantly, jure mariti, belongs to 
the husband; so it is immaterial whether the gift be made to the 
wife or to the husband. But if land be given to the wife it remains 
hers, and the husband can only become entitled to a life estate as 
tenant by the curtesy; whereas, if it be conveyed to the husband, 
the wife takes nothing, save a collateral right to have dower in case 
she survives; so it cannot be said in any sense that she has received 
of her father any land by way of advancement." 
However, after enactment of the statute permitting married women 
to own and dispose of their property, the courts changed the rule and 
held that a ·voluntary inter vivos transfer of property, whether it is real 
or personal property or both, by a father-in-law to a son-in-law is an 
advancement to the daughter even though she was not present at the 
time of the transaction and the father-in-law did not state it was an 
advancement. 377 
374Dicta, Rains v. Hays, 74 Tenn. (6 Lea) 303 (1880). 
375 Hagler v. McCombs, 66 N.C. 345 (1872); Banks v. Shannonhouse, 61 N.C. 284 
(1867); Dixon v. Coward, 57 N.C. (4 Jones Eq.) 354 (1859); Harrington Admr. v. 
Moore, 48 N.C. (3 Jones L.) 56 (1855). Cf. Hinton v. Hinton, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. and 
B. Eq.) 587 (1837). 
376 671 N.C. 284 at 287 (1867). 
377 Rumbly v. Stainton, 24 Ala. 712 (1854); Burnett v. Branch Bank of Mobile, 22 
Ala. 642 (1853); Wilson's Heirs v. Wilson's Admr., 18 Ala. 176 (1850); James v. James, 
41 Ark. 301 (1883); Lindsay v. Platt, 9 Fla. 150 (1860); Ireland v. Dyer, 133 Ga. 851, 
67 S.E. 195 (1910); Dilley v. Love, 61 Md. 603 (1883); McDearman v. Hodnett, 83 
Va. 281, 2 S.E. 643 (1887); Bruce v. Slemp, 82 Va. 352, 4 S.E. 692 (1887). 
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Although the courts changed the law dealing with advancements 
by a father-in-law to a son-in-law, they claim that the married wom-
en's act had no effect on the law regarding advancements. To dem-
onstrate the fallacy of that rule, quotations from two cases will be noted. 
In McDearman v. Hodnett,378 the Virginia court said: 
"The argument is that the act changed the relation of a hus-
band towards his wife as respects her property, which is no longer 
subject to his disposal, or to the payment of his debts, but is to be 
possessed and controlled by her, as though she were a feme sole. 
This may be true, but we do not perceive that it affects the ques-
tion before us. The object of the act is to secure to married women 
the enjoyment and control of their property, but not to interfere 
with the dominion over and right of disposal of one's property, or 
with the general law as respects the dealings between parents and 
their children, or the distribution of decedent's estates. The ques-
tion of advancements ... is not touched or in any way inHuenced 
by the act; nor was it designed to have any such inHuence." 
In Ireland v. Dyer,379 the Georgia court said: 
"It is well settled by the authorities that the donor's intention 
is the controlling principle in the application of the doctrine of 
advancements, and that whatever the donor intended as an ad-
vancement should be so considered without regard to the mode of 
making it or of securing the actual enjoyment of it. According to 
this principle it has many times been held that a gift to a son-in-
law during the life of the donee's wife constitutes an advancement 
to the wife, and it is immaterial that the daughter does not know 
of the advancement to the son-in-law, or that by reason of improper 
investments or otherwise the daughter does not in fact derive any 
benefit from the advancement. Thus the payment by the father of 
his son-in-law's debts may constitute an advancement to the 
daughter. . . . It has been held that the married women's property 
act securing to them their separate property did not prevent an 
advancement to the son-in-law from being deemed an advance-
ment to the daughter." 
The quotation from McDearman v. Hodnett is based on the 
assumption that the married women's act was not intended to change 
the law regarding advancements. That assumption is undoubtedly 
correct. However, the act destroyed the reason back of the rule. As 
shown previously, prior to the enactment of the married women's act, 
the courts held that a transfer of personal property by a father-in-law 
378 83 Va. 281 at 285, 2 S.E. 643 (1887). 
879 133 Ga. 851 at 854, 67 S.E. 195 (1910), quoting from 2 AM. &: Erm. ENc. LAw 
326-327. 
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to a son-in-law was an advancement to the daughter but that a transfer 
of real property was not.380 The reason for the rule was that the hus-
band had control over the personal estate of his wife.381 When the 
married women's act was adopted that reason was destroyed. Conse-
quently, the courts should now hold that a transfer of property from a 
father-in-law to a son-in-law is not an advancement unless consented 
to by the daughter. 
The quotation from Ireland v. Dyer is based on the assumption 
that the intent of the intestate determines the parties to whom the 
concept of advancements applies. However, that assumption is incor-
rect. The intention of the intestate is material only in determining 
whether a voluntary inter vivos transfer is an advancement or a gift. It 
cannot be used to give an intestate the power to extend the doctrine to 
parties not included in the statute. If the statement from Ireland v. 
Dyer is carried to its logical conclusion, a parent could make a gift to 
anyone he desires and charge it to one of his children as an advance-
ment. Such a rule would defeat the very equality that the doctrine is 
intended to preserve. 
The cases decided subsequent to the married women's act rely on 
the Florida case of Lindsay v. Platt382 as authority for the proposition 
that a voluntary inter vivos transfer from a father-in-law to a son-in-law 
is an advancement to his daughter. In that case the transfer was made 
prior to the enactment of the married women's act, but the act was 
passed prior to the intestate's death. The gift was of personal property. 
Therefore the court was warranted in holding that the transaction was 
an advancement. However, that case is not authority for the proposi-
tion that a voluntary inter vivos transfer of real or personal property by 
a father-in-law to a son-in-law subsequent to the married women's act 
is an advancement to the daughter. 
A gift from a father-in-law to a daughter-in-law should be charged 
as an advancement if a gift from a father-in-law to a son-in-law is one. 
However, the courts hold that a transfer to a daughter-in-law is not an 
advancement unless the son consents ta the transaction. 383 
[To be concluded.] 
380Wilson's Heirs v. Wilson's Admr., 18 Ala. 176 (1850); Wentz v. DeHaven, 1 S. 
and R. (Pa.) 312 (1815). 
381 Cf. Burnett v. Branch Bank of Mobile, 22 Ala. 642 (1853); Rumbly v. Stainton, 
24 Ala. 712 (1854). 
3s2 9 Fla. 150 (1860). 
383 Zerega v. Zerega, 78 Misc. 466, 138 N.Y.S. 580 (1912). Cf. Palmer v. Culbert-
son, 65 Hun 625, 20 N.Y.S. 391 (1892), affd. 143 N.Y. 213, 38 N.E. 199 (1894). 
